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Abstract. Data throughput of current high-speed networks makes it
prohibitively expensive to detect attacks using conventional means of
deep packet inspection. The network behavior analysis seemed to be a
solution, but it lacks in several aspects. The academic research focuses on
sophisticated and advanced detection schemes that are, however, often
problematic to deploy into the production. In this paper we try different
approach and take inspiration from industry practice of using relatively
simple but effective solutions. We introduce a model of malicious traffic
based on practical experience that can be used to create simple and ef-
fective detection methods. This model was used to develop a successful
proof-of-concept method for protocol-independent detection of dictio-
nary attacks that is validated with empirical data in this paper.
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1 Introduction
Conventional methods of deep packet inspection (DPI) are being replaced with
methods of network behavior analysis (NBA). The ordinary traffic volume of-
ten exceeds units and tens of gigabits per second. This is a problem for classic
methods of DPI and signature matching that start to demand more processing
power than the current hardware can supply. NBA methods are seen as a poten-
tial remedy, because of their ability to work with aggregated data and to detect
unknown threats [8].
The development of NBA methods diverged into two branches that pursue
different goals using different means. On the one hand, there is the academic
research with a lot of theoretical work and application of sophisticated concepts.
On the other hand, there is the industry practice of using relatively simple, but
effective methods to protect from current threats.
In this paper we try to bring these two branches together by introducing a
model of an attack traffic based on practical experiences with network protection
in the University’s CSIRT1. This model can be used to design anomaly detection
1 Computer Security Incident Response Team – organizational unit responsible for
maintaining security of the University’s network
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schemes that are effective and relatively easy to implement as is demonstrated
by creating a proof-of-concept method for detection of dictionary attacks.
This paper is divided into six sections. Section 2 describes dictionary attacks.
It also presents current advancements in dictionary attack detection and evalu-
ates their detection schemes. Section 3 introduces the concept of traffic classes
to describe attacking traffic. Section 4 is focused on a connection between traffic
classes and different types of attacks. Section 5 presents the detection method
based on properties of one traffic class and also evaluates its effectiveness. Section
6 concludes the paper.
2 Dictionary Attacks
Dictionary attacks exploit valid authentication mechanism, abusing the fact that
users tend to choose weak credentials [6]. It is complicated to detect such attacks,
especially low-profile ones, because an isolated attack attempt differs from a
legitimate one only by intention and not any measurable properties. That is why
they are so prevalent [3], [7], [9]. However, they do not receive enough academic
attention as most research is focused on DoS attacks, botnet activity and other
disturbant behavior [8].
There is a large variety of industry-provided tools to detect dictionary at-
tacks. They are often tied to one particular service and detection is done on a
machine or an application level. Such tools, however, often lack knowledge of
network context and can be bypassed by distributed low-profile attacks. Agent-
based [2] and SIEM systems partially solve this problem by matching anoma-
lies from end computers in one central point. They require specific software to
be configured in end computers and thus fail with BYOD paradigm, though.
Network-level monitoring gives a context and does not require any alteration in
end computers.
We present four tools for network-level detection of dictionary attacks. SSH-
Monitor detects SSH attacks by matching attack signatures [11]. It also comes
with an observation that an attack is always preceded with a port scan and
that most often two or more machines are targeted. SSHCure is based on an
observation that an SSH attack is divided into three phases with distinct flow
properties: the scanning phase, the brute-force phase and the die-off phase [4].
RdpMonitor is an extension of previous tools that is focused on a detection of
RDP attacks [10]. Honeyscan uses synergy of honeypots and network monitoring
to detect various dictionary attacks [5].
These tools, although each taking a different approach, share similar prop-
erties. They use thresholds, focus on statistical properties, and do not take into
account the character of a traffic, i. e. variations in attack. Attackers could easily
subvert these tools by changing their behavior, but practical experience shows
they are not likely to. One reason is the supply of bruteforcing tools that in gen-
eral operate on the same principle. They attack as much as a network or a user
lets them and do not alter attack patterns. Their attacks are then very similar
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and therefore detectable. In the terminology described next, they all belong to
one traffic class.
3 Traffic Classes
A traffic class is a concept that tries to formally describe the character of an
attack traffic by focusing on markers of automated action without special-casing
for networks of different sizes. It is tailored for NetFlow, but it can be modified to
work with e. g. packets. A basic primitive in this concept is a slice – a set of flows
from one source IP address in a given time interval. This slice is characterized
by four traffic dimensions.
The first traffic dimension is visibility that describes traffic in terms of newly
created flows. It is quantized into two values that are functions of current defense
capabilities of given network. Traffic in a slice is visible if there is at least one
detection mechanism in a network that will mark it as anomalous/suspicious
based on statistical properties of its flows. Traffic in a slice is stealthy otherwise.
This way the dimension is relevant for networks of different sizes and detection
capabilities.
The second dimension is periodicity that describes temporal relations be-
tween flows in a slice. It has three possible values. Aperiodic traffic has no
discernible pattern in flow occurrence. Periodic traffic has a pattern in flow
occurrence. Constant traffic has roughly the same number of flows in all slices
of the same length.
The third dimension is similarity that deals with flow similitude. Flows in a
slice can be similar or different based on arbitrary criteria. In this paper we use
overall byte count and duration as a discriminant.
The fourth dimension is the target count that has two possible values: one
target and many targets.
Dimensions that we introduced are orthogonal, so one value for each dimen-
sion can be chosen for every traffic. Therefore, any traffic can be described as a
combination of these dimensions. Let any such combination of traffic dimensions
be called the traffic class.
4 Relation Between Traffic Classes and Attacks
By combining all dimensions we get 24 traffic classes in total. However, they can
be categorized into several groups depending on a dominant detectable dimen-
sion.
The first group is noisy traffic that consist of all visible combinations. Be-
cause traffic is considered visible if it was marked as an attack by at least one
mechanism, this entire group of traffic classes is marked as an anomaly or an
attack. Although this group covers one half of traffic classes, it does not neces-
sarily cover half of attacks a network is facing. For example, a network with only
a thresholding port scan detection would be able to detect periodic, aperiodic,
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distributed, etc. scanners, but would fail to detect dictionary attacks, DoS or
massive spamming.
The second group is flat traffic that consist of stealthy and constant combi-
nations. This group covers traffic generated by bruteforcing tools as described
in Section 2. Traffic with constant pattern that is disrupted only by network
conditions and eventual proxy delays. However, not all flat traffic can be con-
sidered anomalous or harmful as there are valid use cases for such pattern, e. g.
keep-alive. But, it is important to be aware that constant traffic is defined in
terms of constant creation of new flows in given slice and not e. g. constant byte
rate. Such constant appearance of new flows in case of authenticated protocols
like SSH or RDP is always suspicious.
The third group is spiked traffic that consist of stealthy and periodic com-
binations. This group is a superset of flat traffic and it contains anomalies like
beaconing [1], but also a lot of traffic that looks anomalous but in fact is not.
The fourth group is episodic traffic that consist of stealthy and aperiodic
combinations. This group is interesting, because there is no discernible pattern
in flow occurrence. Virtually nothing in the character of traffic points to whether
it is an attack or not. Unless an attacker crosses some threshold, such attacks
are undetectable on a network level.
5 Detecting Dictionary Attacks by Detecting Flat
Network Traffic
In this section we present a proof-of-concept method that is built upon the
assertion that flat traffic to authenticated services is always suspicious. We then
analyze results of this method and compare it with other detection mechanisms
running in the same network.
This method was developed and tested in the network of Masaryk University
(about 15.000 devices online) in the course of two months from 24. 2. 2013 to
24. 4. 2013.
When designing the detection method, we have directly applied the definition
of constant traffic that says that traffic is constant if all slices of the same length
have roughly the same number of flows. However, we had to decide on three key
characteristics – length of slices, their relative temporal position, and measure
of their equal flow count. For the sake of brevity, we omit analyses behind our
choices and present here only the final decisions. These analyses, however, are
available upon request.
Our method works with 60 second slices of 5 minute batches of NetFlow
data. These slices are adjacent and non-overlapping, i. e. there are at most 5
slices for one source IP address in a batch. Slice flow count equality is given
by a function that measures the relative difference between flow count in adja-
cent non-zero slices. The method was successfully used with following protocols:
FTP(S), SSH, Telnet, LDAP, HTTP(S), AFP, RDP and SMTP. Flat traffic de-
tection for HTTP(S) was found to be ineffective, because valid AJAX updates
common on Web 2.0 tend to produce flat traffic pattern.
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5.1 Identification of Attackers
Figure 1 presents the number of identified instances of flat traffic in five-minute
traffic windows and unique source IP addresses for various thresholds of relative
difference. Only differences up to 109% was taken into account. Anything higher
was automatically considered non-flat traffic. As was expected, graphs of identi-
fied source IP addresses grow faster than the graphs of attacks. In case of SSH
and RDP services that are often targets of attacks, even the 50% threshold was
enough to identify more than 90% of potential attackers.
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Fig. 1. Amount of flat traffic and its sources based on a relative difference threshold
Definitive evaluation of data is complicated, because the detection was car-
ried out on an unannotated data, therefore, we have decided to compare our
results with three other detection mechanisms deployed in the same network.
We chose 60 % as a relative difference threshold and identified 3139 unique
IP addresses targeting port TCP/3389. RdpMonitor [10] that detects attacks
on this port found at the same time 852 attackers of which our method de-
tected 410. Our method also identified 320 unique IP addresses targeting port
TCP/22. SSHMonitor [11] found 29 attackers on this port of which we found 5,
and honeyscan [5] found 57 attackers of which we found 15. Manual inspection
of a sample of remaining addresses undetected by other tools concluded that
they were likely to be actual attacks. However, conclusive proof is not available
because the data on targeted machines is not available. The likely reason why
the proof-of-concept method detects order of magnitude more attackers than
deployed methods is their high threshold to avoid false-positives.
6 Conclusion
In this paper we have presented a model of attack traffic that puts emphasis
on a distinction between artificial and human-initiated traffic. Based on this
model, we created the proof-of-concept method that successfully detects one
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type of attacks against various services. By applying concepts of this model, other
methods can be devised that will detect other previously overlooked attacks that
currently hide below detection thresholds. Relative simplicity of this model and
its application also lowers bars for industry adoption.
Detection of malicious traffic based on a character of traffic proved to be a
promising approach. In our future work, we will explore other detection schemes
based on a character of traffic that can be used as a stand-alone or complemen-
tary detection mechanisms. We will also research other possible traffic classes
and their respective groupings.
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